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PREFACE 
Extant literatures in memory, cognition, and other 
information processing areas have demonstrated differences 
between dep+essed and nondepressed samples. Theoretical 
models have proliferated (e.g. Beck, 1967; Bower,1983). 
These studies are almost exclusively based in conscious 
processing of stimuli. The literature pertaining to 
nonconsciously mediated processing has failed to factor in 
individual differences. These auditory perception 
experiments attempted to extend the scope by investigating 
nonconscious processing while including individual 
differences. Experiment 1 included two such factors. 
College students were screened for "depression" using the 
BDI and contrasted with a group of nondepressed students. 
The second.factor was "self-relevance" which individualized 
the affectively varying stimulus words (pleasant, 
depressive, and neutral) by dividing them into high and low 
relevance based on each participant's ratings. Using a 
dichotic masking paradigm, which addresses the 
methodological flaws of dichotic listening, three data sets 
were analyzed. The results were inconsistent with predicted 
mood congruent hypotheses. Despite this lack of evidence 
for between group (depression) differences, there was a 
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clear advantage for processing of depressively valanced 
words both nonconsciously and consciously. This was in 
contrast to a "pleasant" response bias. An alternative 
conceptualization of "valence" is discussed which posits 
that words' "arousability" effects how they are processed 
both consciously and nonconsciously. The "self-relevance" 
factor enhanced processing only for the consciously 
perceived material. Experiment 2 also contained the between 
subject factor "depression". An attempt was made to expand 
existing literature showing nonconscious semantic priming 
into the affective/ emotional domain. Prime-target word 
pairs were either matched or unmatched based on their 
"valence". Results were consistent with a demonstration of 
a nonconscious emotional priming effect. Mood failed to 
interact with valence. Depressed subjects identified more 
target words than the nondepressed group. The absence of 
interactions between valence and mood is discussed. A 
general discussion points to the import of considering the 
arousability of stimulus words when doing attention and 
perception studies as opposed to discrete categories (e.g. 
pleasant, depressive). Finally, dichotic masking is 
discussed as an approach to auditory perception with 
considerable promise. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The Effects of Depression 1 
Experiment 1 
A significant amount of attention has been devoted to 
the cognitive factors in the mediation of depression. 
Empirical findings related to cognition and information 
processing in depression span a broad spectrum of research 
from social psychological factors to the workings of the 
unconscious. Much less has been done in clinical psychology 
and its populations in nonconscious information processing. 
This is somewhat ironic considering the historical emphasis 
on the unconscious in clinical practice and the high 
prevalence of depression (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). This paper seeks to review and integrate existing 
literatures in related areas of information processing. Two 
experiments are presented. These studies investigate 
nonconscious processing, response bias, perceptual accuracy, 
and nonconscious priming in depressed and nondepressed 
samples. For the purposes of these studies, particular 
interest will be focused on individual differences as they 
are operationally defined psychometrically. The research 
asks the question whether psychometric assignment of 
depression involves differences in cognitive processing. 
The Cognitive Effects of Depression 
There is extensive empirical and clinical evidence of 
differences in thinking between groups assessed as depressed 
and those measured as normal. Cognitive behavioral models 
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of depression have proliferated (Beck, 1967, 1976; Bandura, 
1973; Ellis, 1977; Meichenb~um, 1977). Beck (1967, 1976) 
has asserted that distorted thought processes maintain the 
affective, emotional, and behavioral manifestations of 
depression. The characteristic use of cognitive 
distortions, such as catastrophizing, selective abstraction, 
arbitrary inference, dichotomous thinking, and 
overgeneralization sustain the depressed person in negative 
views of self, world, and future (Beck, 1976). 
Many different methodologies have been used to compare 
depressed individuals with normals. One such approach has 
been the development of questionnaires that measure various 
types of cognitive distortion. Warren, Stake, and McKee 
(1982) developed the Interpretation Inventory with questions 
to address Beck's distortions. For example, "A friend walks 
by and does not appear to see you. Do you think your friend 
is just avoiding you?" (arbitrary inference). Subjects then 
rated their response tendencies on a five-point scale 
. ranging from "never think that way" to "always think that 
way". The results indicated that depressed subjects' 
ratings were significantly more distorted than normals due 
to their making more negative inferences. 
Norman, Miller, and Klee (1983) developed the Cognitive 
Bias Questionnaire. Four stories adapted for clinical 
patients (Krantz & Hammen, 1979) were followed by multiple 
choice questions, each coded according to two dichotomous 
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dimensions: depressed versus nondepressed in tone and mood, 
and distorted versus nondistorted in terms of logical 
inference from the story. They found that depressed 
subjects selected significantly more negatively valenced 
responses. In addition, their instrument correlated 
significantly with other self-report measures (e.g. The Be·ck 
Depression Inventory). 
Fennel and Campbell (1984), in their Cognitions 
Questionnaire, presented depressed and normal subjects with 
scenarios and had them rate them on five forced-choice 
interpretations. Depressed subjects were significantly more 
likely than normals to endorse negative interpretations 
deemed distorted by the authors. Additionally, depressed 
subjects' endorsements of items were consistent with Beck's 
delineations of characteristic differences (e.g., 
overgeneralization, catastrophizing, etc.). Watkins and 
Rush (1983) produced similar results by presenting subjects 
with open-ended vignettes from their Cognitive Response 
Test. They assessed cognitive distortion along similar 
dimensions as Beck (1967) and Fennel and Campbell (1984), 
only renaming the distortions: demandingness, absolutism, 
attribution to luck, and exaggeration. 
Numerous other studies have corroborated the basic 
tenet that there is a qualitative difference between the way 
depressed and normals make judgements about themselves and 
sometimes others. Galin (1989) had students judge the 
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plausibility of positive and negative inferences ostensibly 
made by themselves or by others. The depressed students 
deemed negative self-inferences as more plausible and 
positive other-inferences as less plausible. 
Another study demonstrated depressed subjects' tendency 
to endorse significantly more negative self-talk and 
significantly less positive self-talk than normals on an 
extended version of The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989). Sackheim and Wegner (1986) 
looked at differences in how depressed versus.normal 
subjects experience failure. They found that depressed 
subjects rated degree of control as less for positive 
outcomes than negative outcomes. 
MacDonald and Kuiper (1984) investigated the 
consistency of self-schema processing by having subjects 
make a series of self-referent personality judgements 
concerning depressive-content and nondepressive-content 
personal adjectives. Consistency was found between 
dichotomous yes-no self-ratings and subsequent 9-point 
self-reference ratings. Not surprisingly, greater decision 
consistency was found for schema-congruent content with 
depressed subjects endorsing depressive adjectives 
relatively more frequently. 
The effect of depression in making judgments has also 
been extended into the social context to varying degrees. 
It is presented here to corroborate and extend intrapersonal 
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data and to briefly highlight the social/interpersonal 
impact of depression. Dykmam and Volpicelli (1983) wanted 
to know whether depressed subjects' biases occurred across 
all situations or only in those with evaluative 
significance. Subjects performed a dot estimation task 
under·varying feedback (i·.e., good, average, poor, or 
ambiguous). Analyses revealed that depressed subjects were 
more apt than normals to judge their feedback as negative. 
Perception of negative feedback was most pronounced under 
ambiguous feedback conditions. 
A series of studies was conducted using a videotape of 
a 9 year old girl portrayed as either depressed or 
nondepressed and as having experienced high or low recent 
life stress. Subjects (school teachers) rated their.own 
level of anxiety and depression before and after the film. 
They then rated their attributions (negative or positive) 
about the child, feelings of affiliation, judgments of the 
child's attractiveness, and expectations about future 
behavior and the need for therapy. It was consistently 
demonstrated that the child's level of depression influenced 
almost every rating, including ratings of their own 
depression (Peterson, Wonderlich, Reaven, & Mullins, 1987; 
Mullins, Peterson, Wonderlich & Reaven, 1986). 
In other studies involving interpersonal implications, 
results are consistent in demonstrating an interpretive bias 
in depressed subjects. Janowsky, Kraft, Clopton, and Huey 
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(1984) showed a negative correlation between negative moods 
and the subject's judgments of degree of regard, congruence, 
empathy, and unconditionality shown by a professional who 
had interviewed them. Lowenstein and Hokanson (1986) 
reported that subsequent to an acquaintanceship paradigm 
exposure (casual interaction with an experimenter), 
moderately dysphoric subjects displayed relatively negative 
appraisals of how they thought the speaker perceived them as 
compared to controls. Swallow and Kuiper (1987) had 
undergraduates rate their similarity to others on a Likert 
scale and generate a list of attributes thought to typify 
the "average other person". Subjects judged themselves to 
be less similar to others as depression level increased. 
And lastly, Radenhausen (1989) showed that depressed 
subjects rated themselves more negatively on a combined 
measure of personality traits and the experimenter more 
negatively for supportiveness traits relative to 
nondepressed subjects. This distorting effect of depression 
on social cognition has also been demonstrated using mood 
induction (Bollenbach & Madigan 1982). 
It has been shown that cognitive distortions occur in 
different diagnostic categories, as well. For example, 
McNally and Foa (1987) demonstrated that agoraphobics were 
more likely than normals to interpret ambiguous bodily 
stimuli as threatening and were also more likely than 
normals to exaggerate the probability and cost of unpleasant 
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events. Ingram (1989) investigated the automatic thinking 
and accuracy in depressed and socially anxious subjects. He 
found that although negative automatic thinking was specific 
to the depressed group, the amount of positive thinking was 
impaired in both groups. 
Depressive Accuracy 
From the proliferation of research emerging out of the 
forementioned cognitive theories of depression has come some 
interesting results that have called into question the 
notion of "distortion". More specifically, there seems to 
be a group of people psychometrically defined as depressed 
who show a more accurate response tendency than their so 
called normal counterpart control groups with normal scores. 
That is, the labeled depressed subjects often are more 
objective in their analysis and judgments ("sadder but 
wiser") while the normal subjects demonstrate a positive 
distortion or bias ("Pollyanna hypothesis" [Osgood and 
Hoosain, 1983]). 
Other studies have corroborated this finding. Doppler 
and Stanners (1990) did so using a dichotic masking 
paradigm. Dichotic masking presents a word to one ear and a 
white noise mask to the other to make stimulus items 
unidentifiable. They found a significant tendency for 
nondepressed subjects to respond pleasant more often to 
unidentified words than depressed subjects, regardless of 
the type of word presented. However, there was no 
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significant tendency for depressed subjects to produce a 
higher frequency of unpleasant responses than nondepressed 
subjects. Further, there was a significant tendency for 
nondepressed subjects to correctly identify more pleasant 
than depressive words while there was no evidence of this 
for depressed subjects (Doppler & Stanners, 1990). It is 
important to point out that this was not an overall accuracy 
effect. On the contrary, · the overall means for correct 
identification were virtually the same for depressed and 
nondepressed subjects. The asymmetry was in the same 
direction in both the response bias and correct 
identification results. That is, the differences between 
depressed and nondepressed groups were only apparent for the 
pleasant (both word and response) material. 
Vestre and Caulfield (1986) reported that nondepressed 
subjects showed some tendency toward distortion. In their 
study, cognitive distortion was evaluated by giving 
depressed and nondepressed subjects feedback about their 
personalities using neutral descriptions. The results 
indicated that depressed subjects, "were objectively more 
accurate in their interpretation of their evaluation," (p. 
35). The authors went on to suggest that it is nondepressed 
subjects who distort feedback showing, 11 a 'normal' positive 
biasing effect," (p. 35). 
Similarly, Martin, Abramson, and Alloy (1984) 
demonstrated that depressed subjects' judgments as accurate 
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with regard to control over a noncontingent but positive 
outcome. This was in contrast to nondepressed subjects' 
tendency to overestimate their control. Tang (1990) used a 
similar method of contingency management to demonstrate 
depressed subjects' tendency to make more accurate judgments 
than nondepressed subjects regarding control over a light 
that might or might not come on. Again, nondepressed 
subjects overestimated their personal control. Roth and 
Ingram (1985) demonstrated a negative correlation between 
the Self Deception Questionnaire and depression. And 
Richters and Pellegrini (1989) showed agreement between 
depressed mothers and teachers of their children in 
reporting behavior problems. This agreement, according to 
the authors, challenged the assumption that depression 
associations necessarily reflect distortion. As Kuiper, 
Olinger, and MacDonald (1985) suggest from the results of 
their study, mild depressives have a view of self that 
incorporates both valences, positive and negative, in 
content. 
In addition to these studies there have been two review 
articles in the literature that have dealt with the issue of 
cognitive distortion and more specifically with where the 
distortion actually lies. Ruehlman, West, and Pasahow 
(1985) reviewed the evaluative tendencies of 
psychometrically defined severely depressed, mildly 
depressed, and nondepressed individuals in the areas of 
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judgements of contingency, attributions of causality, 
expectancy estimates, and self-reference. They concluded 
that cognitive distortion manifests itself with negativistic 
evaluative bias in severely depressed individuals and that 
nondepressed subjects tend to exhibit positive evaluative 
responses. Those categorized as mildly depressed display 
unbiased (neither negative or positive) evaluative response 
patterns. B~umeister (1989) proposed that optimal 
psychological functioning is associated with a slight to 
moderate degree of positive distortion in a person's 
perception of one's self and world. He cites research that 
has shown that highly accurate perceptions are associated 
with depression and goes on to discuss an optimal margin of 
illusion. 
Perceptual Defense 
Another body of literature exists that seems related to 
the nondepressed tendency to distort or be sensitized to the 
positive while under-perceiving negative materials. This is 
known as the perceptual defense and vigilance hypothesis, 
(Erdelyi, 1974; Bruner, 1943). It is otherwise known as the 
"New Look" in perception (Bruner & Postman, 1947, Erdelyi, 
1992; Bruner, 1992). In its early history, the New Look was 
seen as an interactive phenomenon with perception being the 
result of organismic factors such as needs, expectancies, 
and defenses (Erdelyi, 1992, Bruner & Postman, 1947) The 
early data was primarily tachistoscopic (visual) 
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presentation of taboo words which were shown to have higher 
identification thresholds in comparison to neutral words 
(reviewed by Erdelyi, 1974). What followed was over 1000 
articles investigating the New Lock's principal assertions 
of the perceptual defense and vigilance hypothesis. It is 
stated by Erdelyi (1974), "that perception of stimuli may be 
inhibited (perceptual defense) or enhanced (perceptual 
vigilance) as a function of the input_' s emotionality," (p. 
3) . 
Around 1960, major criticisms befell the theoretical 
notions of New Look that interacted with the era's 
Zeitgeist. Academic psychology had been dominated by 
behaviorism and mentalistic inferences were yet to be fully 
acknowledged as plausible (Greenwald, 1992). Additionally, 
any possible scientific results that implied a homunculus or 
that might corroborate psychodynamics and a complex 
functioning unconscious (Freudian notions) were.out ·of the 
mainstream from an interpretive standpoint. However, the 
cognitive revolution was on its way. But in order to 
maintain or regain scientific respectability, a new 
vernacular would have to follow to divorce findings from 
psychodynamic interpretations. For example: filtering 
would replace censorship, executive processes would replace 
ego, decision nodes would replace conflict, and working 
memory would replace conscious, and so on (Loftus & Klinger, 
1992) . 
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Erikson (1960) wrote compelling articles challenging 
the New Look on many fronts. The first was the 'logical 
paradox' which asks how a perceiver can defend against 
something unless they first perceive the stimulus being 
defended against. Second, by having vigilance and defense 
built in to the theoretical machinery, it seemed circular 
and lended itself too readily to post hoc analyses that 
could explain basically any result. Third was the problem 
of word frequency where the commonness of a word in the 
language could act to confound defense or vigilance results 
(commonness leading to lower thresholds). The final, most 
important, and ubiquitous of the critiques was the issue of 
response bias (Holender, 1986; Dixon, 1981; Erdelyi, 1974). 
Simply, response bias is the tendency to respond in some 
patterned or biased way regardless of the meaning of the 
stimulus. 
Erdelyi (1974) did an effective job of responding to 
each of the first three criticisms and appears to render 
them less than disconfirming to the literature. However, 
the debate remained with regard to response bias and 
separating "pure perception" from response (Dixon, 1981; 
Erdelyi, 1992, 1976,1974; Greenwald, 1992; Holender, 1986; 
Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth 1992; Lewicki, 1992; Loftus & 
Klinger, 1992; Marcel, 1983). Perceptual defense and 
vigilance were interpreted as operations that either 
screened a subject from, or sensitized the subject to, 
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certain stimuli. This was in concert with the still strong 
clinical beliefs of unconsciously mediated processes, which 
badly needed stronger empirical support to add to the 
clinical observations of such phenomena. We now turn our 
attention to the next area of review; data in nonconscious 
(unconscious) processing. 
Nonconscious Perception 
That nonconscious processing exists is no longer an 
issue. Indeed some approaches to studying it have brought 
it back into scientific respectability by keeping 
explanations in information processing nomenclature away 
from psychodynamically based interpretations (Klinger & 
Loftus, 1992). There are notable exceptions to this 
(Silverman, 1985; Erdelyi, 1992). Erdelyi states that the 
unconscious must be reclaimed gingerly. Despite the 
differences in theoretical vantage points, there are recent 
studies that appear to fit into a perceptual defense 
interpretive scheme. 
When approaching research in the area of cognitive 
psychology, particularly in the domain of nonconscious or 
preconscious processes, it becomes apparent that some 
delineations need to be made prior to hypothesizing and 
theorizing. As Erdelyi (1992) elucidates, strictly 
speaking, much of the research being done in nonconscious 
processing today, although not completely independent of the 
unconscious and all its historical mystique, is different 
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from psychodynamics and its conceptualizations. Much of the 
controversy surrounds attempts at sorting findings on the 
distinction between responses to inputs and actual 
perception of those inputs (Erdelyi, 1992, Holender, 1986, 
Loftus & Klinger, 1992). The problem is that there is no 
possible way to elicit immediate responses to stimuli. As 
Erdelyi (1992) states, "Indeed perception itself is not 
immediate, but a microgenetic process unfolding over time, 
no response can bypass the objection," (p. 785); (see also 
Dixon, 1981, p. 140). That is to say, perception probably 
represents several points along a temporal continuum between 
physical sensation and psychological 'meaning'. 
For the purposes of these experiments, then, 
nonconscious perception can be thought of as a process by 
which a verbal stimulus activates semantic (meaning) 
information without conscious identification; the latter 
being indicated by some form of verbal report (Dixon, 1971). 
Holender (1986) provides an extensive review of the 
literature in this area which shows the limited amount of 
data that is directly relevant to the present experiments 
which are unique in their endeavors into the rarely 
researched auditory mode of presentation. The existing 
research on nonconscious perception in the auditory modality 
will now be reviewed. 
In a dichotic listening (different than dichotic 
masking) study done by MacKay (1973, Experiment 2), the 
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subjects repeated ambiguous sentences ("The hunters noticed 
the bark.") presented to one ear while a disambiguating word 
("dog") was presented to the other (unattended) ear. A 
subsequent forced-choice recognition task indicated that the 
disambiguating word facilitated the appropriate 
interpretation of the sentence. In order to deal with the 
possibility that subjects had momentarily switched attention 
to the unattended channel, MacKay (1973, Experiment 3) 
stopped the subjects after the last sentence and asked for 
identification of the unattended word. Because only one out 
of 36 subjects correctly identified the word, MacKay 
concluded that nonconscious processing had taken place. 
This conclusion is problematic because the identification 
test was given only once. Additionally, the time duration 
between presentation of the word and the identification test 
might have allowed some subjects to consciously perceive and 
then rapidly forget the disambiguating word. 
Additional controls were introduced by Newstead and 
Dennis (1979, Experiment 4) to prevent attention switching. 
In their experiment, the disambiguating words were preceded 
and followed by other words on the unattended channel. The 
reason was that in MacKay's experiment, words were coming 
out of silence and thus more likely to induce an attentional 
switch. Newstead and Dennis also eliminated the time 
duration between the sentences which may have allowed 
subjects to recover the word from a precategorical memory. 
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With these controls in place, MacKay's results could not be 
replicated. When the controls were relaxed (Experiment 4), 
the MacKay results were replicated. 
Johnston and Dark (1982) compared a divided attention 
condition (subject attends to both channels) with a focused 
attention condition (subject attends to only one channel). 
They measured the extent to which a dichotically-presented 
word would bias the interpretation of a visually-presented 
test word which had two distinct meanings. In the focused 
attention condition the bias-inducing word occurred on the 
unattended channel. A significant biasing effect was found 
for the divided attention condition but not for the focused 
attention condition seeming to indicate that attention was 
required for semantic processing. 
There appears to be a critical design flaw in the 
dichotic listening paradigm. That is, there is no way to 
insure that even a very brief attentional shift has not 
occurred (Bolender, 1986). Alternatively, dichotic masking 
(a word presented to one ear and a white noise mask to the 
other) is a method that eliminates the problem of attention 
switching since the subject consistently attends to the ear 
in which the word is presented. By controlling the sound 
level of the word and mask, the word can be made 
unidentifiable. Dichotic masking can provide assessment of 
nonconscious perception under Dixon's (1971) criterion. 
Specifically, if a subject can be shown to have acquired 
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some information about a stimulus word without being able to 
report the word accurately, then nonconscious perception has 
been demonstrated. 
Semantic priming is a phenomenon in which a word 
(prime) facilitates or inhibits the perception of a 
subsequently-presented word (target). Stanners, Cherry, and 
Carver (1989) used the dichotic masking paradigm to 
demonstrate semantic priming effects of unidentifiable prime 
words. Results showed both a facilitative priming effect 
for associatively related words and an inhibitory priming 
effect for unrelated words. The topic of Experiment 2 
attempts to extend research in this area. 
Memory and Emotion 
In order to interrelate the cognitive distortion and 
nonconscious perception literature, we move now to the data 
suggesting depressive effects on memory. A predominant 
theory in mood and memory that has gained support from 
numerous studies is that of Bower's (1981). Bower proposes 
that human memory can be modeled in terms of semantic 
concepts and schemata that are used to describe events. 
Memory is represented as events in a cluster of descriptive 
propositions. Through experience new associative 
connections are established among instances of the concepts 
used in describing the event. The proposition represents 
the basic unit of thought. By activation of a proposition 
and its concepts, one engages the basic process of thought. 
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Consciousness is represented by the contents of sensations, 
concepts, and propositions whose current level of activation 
exceeds some threshold. During activation, a spreading 
effect presumably takes place from one concept to another, 
or from one proposition to another, by associative linkages 
among them. 
Bower (1981) goes on to consider two basic phenomena 
that integrate affect (emotion) into the memory model. The 
first is the mood congruity effect which means that people 
attend to and learn more about events that match their 
emotional state. The basis of this effect is that the 
memory representations for the congruent mood are in a 
higher state of activation. The second phenomenon is the 
mood-state-dependent-retention effect which means that 
people tend to recall events better if they reinstate the 
original emotion that was present during learning. 
Therefore, one implication that seems to emerge is that 
emotional state should enhance the salience of 
mood-congruent material for selective attention and 
learning, as suggested by Powell and Hemsley (1984). 
Indeed several studies of mood and memory have shown 
that memories consistent in valence with an individual's 
mood state facilitate both recall and speed of retrieval. 
The procedures of these studies varied in many ways, 
demonstrating the robustness of the basic relationship 
between mood and memory. For example, Isen, Shalker, Clark, 
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and Karp, (1978) gave subjects a recall test of negatively 
and positively valenced words subsequent to failure or 
success experiences. Words consistent with the subject's 
experience were recalled more frequently than inconsistent 
words. Riskind, Rholes, and Eggers (1982), Snyder and White 
(1982), Teasdale and Fogarty (1979), and Teasdale and 
Taylor (1981) manipulated mood by means of the Velten Mood 
Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) and then asked 
subjects to recall life experiences. Subjects consistently 
recalled events congruent with the mood induced. 
In all of the studies mentioned directly above, 
memories consistent with induced mood were more accessible. 
Laird, Wagner, Halal, and Szegda (1982) and Riskind (1983) 
manipulated subjects' facial expressions and found that 
memory was better when the material to be recalled was 
affectively consistent with the mood state implied by the 
facial expression. Bower (1981) used hypnosis to induce 
mood and found effects on recall of life experiences and 
experimentally induced learning that further corroborated 
the effect of mood on memory. 
Individual Differences in Memory 
It is implicit in Bower's theory (1981) that personal 
experience is the natural process in the development of 
propositional networks. This indicates the import of the 
development of individual differences in memory. It is 
plausible that a person who experiences depressive or 
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pleasant moods more often would have more of their memory 
devoted to congruent propositions. It is possible that 
simple induction of mood in a subject might not provide an 
adequate measure of the existence of the truly qualitative 
memory differences between depressed and normal subjects 
(Cherry, 1993). Therefore, ·there might be an enhanced 
effect if the experimenter used naturally occurring 
depression as opposed to mood induction. Presumably a 
person who experiences more time in a depressed mood state 
would encode into memory relatively more mood congruent 
material. As Mayo (1983) asserted, there may be long-term 
influences on memory reflected in personality traits which 
are associated with the accessibility of positive and 
negative experiences encoded. 
Indeed, there have been studies that have used clinical 
populations and naturally occurring moods to extend the 
analogue laboratory studies of mood induction. Clark and 
Teasdale (1982) and Lloyd and Lishman (1975) found that 
naturally occurring depression increases the accessibility 
of memories of affectively negative life experiences. 
Williams and Broadbent (1986) examined autobiographical 
memory in subjects who had recently attempted suicide by 
overdose. Subjects were required to retrieve specific 
personal memories to positive or negative cue words. 
Compared to control groups the suicide attempters showed 
biased retrieval. The bias was evidenced in delayed 
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retrieval of positive memories rather than speeded retrieval 
of negative memories. 
In another study, Bargh and Tota (1988) used a 
concurrent memory load paradigm. Depressed and nondepressed 
subjects judged each of a series of depressive and 
nondepressive adjectives as to their descriptiveness of the 
self or the average other person. Some subjects, while 
making each judgment, held six digits in working memory. 
They found that the memory load manipulation resulted in 
depressed subjects reliably demonstrating a smaller increase 
in latencies for depressive content than for nondepressive 
content in making the judgment of self-description. The 
reverse was true for nondepressed subjects. This suggested 
to the authors that depressive content had less of an 
inhibiting effect on processing the information for 
depressed subjects. 
Self Reference 
Another attempt to more accurately look at individual 
differences in depression and memory has. explored 
self-referenced (self-relevant) stimulus material. This 
approach brings the exploration of cognition and memory even 
closer to individual experience and perhaps provides an 
opportunity to address idiosyncracies that might otherwise 
obscure effects. 
Bradley and Mathews (1983) used recall measures for 
self- versus other- person referent positive and negative 
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adjectives. They compared depressed and matched normals. 
Depressed subjects recalled more negative than positive 
adjectives and this bias was only apparent in the 
self-referent condition. Bradley and Mathews (1988) later 
replicated their findings and added a group of recovered 
depressives. Again depressives showed self-referent bias in 
recall of negative adjectives, whereas, the recovered group 
and the controls recalled more positive than negative 
self-referent material. Additionally, in an other- person 
referent condition, recovered depressives recalled fewer 
positive than negative adjectives. The authors concluded 
that retrieval operations in recovery are not completely 
normal, yet not as biased toward negativity as they were in 
the depressed condition. 
Kuiper and MacDonald (1982) had subjects who varied on 
a depressive dimension rate the applicability of positive 
and negative personality adjectives to themselves. In an 
incidental recall period, normals remembered significantly 
more positive information about themselves than negative, 
whereas mild depressives recalled equal amounts of positive 
and negative self-referent material., 
Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, and Greenberg (1989) 
hypothesized that the negative memory bias in depressed 
people is mediated by excessive levels of self-focused 
attention. They instructed nondepressed and subclinically 
depressed subjects to either focus on themselves or 
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externally, and then to recall 10 events that had happened 
to them during the previous two weeks. Events recalled by 
depressed subjects were more negative than events recalled 
by nondepressed subjects under the self-focused but not the 
external-focus condition. Forgas, Bower, and Krantz (1984) 
demonstrated a relationship between hypnotically induced 
mood (pleasant and depressed) and measures on recall memory 
and behavior assessments after subjects had participated in 
an interactive setting while videotaping them. One day 
later, subjects were hypnotized and a happy or depressed 
mood induced. Strong mood influences were demonstrated on· 
behavior assessments and recall memory as well as an effect 
due to self- versus other- target. The influences were 
consistent with other findings showing a mood congruent 
memory effect. 
What the self-referent/relevant data suggests is that 
memory studies and their effects are enhanced when stimulus 
materials are related to the subject's experiential base; 
here deemed self-relevant. Individual differences might be 
enhanced by tailoring stimuli to the actual memories for 
people; as in depression where encoding is likely relatiyely 
more negative emotionally. 
Thus, in the literature on cognitive "distortion" in 
depressed and other disorders, individual differences can be 
shown to affect information processing. This supports the 
original intention to demonstrate that such effects can 
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occur on various levels of information processing (e.g. 
cognition, memory, perception). Additionally, it is 
apparent that there exists a lack of research in 
nonconscious levels of processing using individual 
differences as a factor in either experimental or clinically 
oriented investigations. 
Perceptual Sensitivity 
There has also been a limited amount of research done 
directly on differences between groups in perceptual 
sensitivity. This can be thought of as differential 
receptivity to qualitatively differing stimuli. There are 
some data, however, that seem to corroborate the idea. 
McNally, Kaspi, Rieman, and Zeitlin (1990) had Vietnam 
combat veterans with and without posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) perform a modified Stroop task in which they 
named the colors of neutral words, positive words, 
obsessive-compulsive words, and PTSD words. PTSD subjects 
took significantly longer than controls to color-name PTSD 
than neutral, OCD, and positive words. The increased latency 
was interpreted to be Stroop interference which was defined 
to reflect involuntary semantic activation. 
Schotte, McNally, and Turner (1990) examined whether 
bulimics would exhibit enhanced perceptual and physiological 
sensitivity for material related to their concerns about 
body shape and weight. They varied concern related target 
words with neutral words using a dichotic listening task in 
The Effects of Depression 25 
which skin conductance responses were recorded. Bulimic 
subjects detected the concern related target more often than 
the neutral word when both were presented to the unattended 
channel and exhibited larger skin conductance responses to 
concern related words. These differences were not observed 
in controls. Additional research has demonstrated that 
anxious people show selective attention to. verbal stimuli 
having connotations of threat in both clinically anxious 
individuals (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) and in 
psychiatrically normal people displaying high levels of 
anxiety (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987). 
What the review of literature indicates at this point 
is that psychometrically defined groups, principally 
depressed people, show a variety of differences in 
information processing. These differences are documented in 
cognitively mediated dimensions including judgment and 
interpersonal responses. Research was also reviewed that 
extends the differences to learning and memory as well as 
more automatic levels of attention and perception, both 
consciously and nonconsciously. 
Beck's model (1967) suggests that idiosyncratic 
maladaptive cognitive schemata are activated in the 
depressed person. Schemata are defined as organized 
representations of 'prior experiences' which screen, code, 
categorize, and evaluate information. Bower (1981) likewise 
suggests that links have been laid down by prior association 
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of concepts with particular mood states. Thus each subject 
is likely to have highly idiosyncratic associative networks 
depending on personal experience. 
The major implication is that because memories are 
individualized, treating them as a group compromises 
accuracy. If stimulus material could be individualized, it 
should increase effects. Stimulus irrelevance, stemming 
from a standard group of stimuli which might not activate 
memory for some subjects; would be somewhat distinguished by 
using those words deemed most relevant to the self by each 
subject. As it has been demonstrated, there are factors 
that contribute to the development of an individual's 
memory. By isolating depression as one factor we can ask 
the empirical question of whether such a factor enhances 
effects in basic levels (nonconscious) of information 
processing. 
Experiment 1 stands as an attempt to improve upon the 
precision of the Doppler and Stanners (1990) study that 
failed to indicate nonconscious perception effects. By 
tailoring stimulus material (words) to concepts associated 
with an individual's memory and presenting stimulus items 
with the dichotic masking paradigm, it is hypothesized that 
nonconscious perception will be enhanced with higher level 
of accuracy in classification and identification obtained. 
Subjects will evaluate items from a pool of affective words 
prior to the dichotic-masking task on the basis of their 
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self-descriptiveness or self-relevance. Then the 
dichotic-masking procedure will carried out. The items 
endorsed by subjects as self-relevant prior to the 
experimental procedure will then be used as the 
unique/idiosyncratic stimulus words in the analyses. This 
serves to individualize stimulus materials. Based on the 
aforementioned models and literature review, it is predicted 
that subjects' mood would have a stronger effect on words 
endorsed as self-relevant by the subject. 
Method 
Subjects 
College students (24 male and 24 female) were screened 
from psychology courses at Oklahoma State University.· The 
screening included having them complete the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). Criterion levels recommended by Beck and used 
efficaciously in other research (Krantz & Liu, 1987; Vestre 
& Caulfield, 1986; Warren, Stake, & Klee, 1982; Fennel & 
Campbell, 1984), were set within the range of mild to more 
severe levels for depressed subjects (mean= 17.2, range 12-
28), while nondepressed subjects' scores were also 
controlled and did not exceed the criterion score set at 4 
(mean= 1.6, range 0-4). All participants were native 
speakers of English and right handed by self-designation. 
It should be noted, scores in the range of 10-15 are 
classified as "mild depression" (Young, 1982} and 
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"dysphoric" (Kendall, et al, 1987). 
The screening procedure also included a list of 150 
words varying on an affective ("valence") dimension 
(pleasant, neutral, and depressive). The individuals were 
asked to rate each word on a five-point Likert scale as to 
its self-relevance or applicability to their experience. 
Materials 
Pleasant words were selected from an evaluation study 
conducted by Stanners and Gordon (1989). The experimenters 
played words on an audio tape to groups (n = 200) of 
students who then rated them on a scale from one (low) to 
seven (high) for level of pleasantness. Words with greater 
than 5 pleasantness ratings were selected for use as 
pleasant words and so designated·in this study. In two 
other studies, Stanners and Gordon (1989) compiled semantic 
judgements of words by having subjects categorize them as 
either pleasant or unpleasant. [Neutral words were 
operationalized as those words subjects categorized as 
pleasant or unpleasant at approximately a chance level 
(50%)]. Neutral words were selected for this study as those 
nearest to chance level categorization. Unpleasant 
(depressive) words were selected from the Depressive 
Adjective Checklists (DACL) forms A-G (Lubin, 1965). The 
DACL forms are lists of adjectives used to assess depression 
by having the subject endorse those words that describe 
their current mood state. They have been used extensively 
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in research and assessment of depression (Christenfeld, et 
al., 1978, Cherry, 1993). Additional depressive words were 
chosen from a study in which subjects made associations to 
depressively valenced words. The study yielded several 
words reliably identified as congruent with the stimulus 
words (Wohl and Izawa, 1979). 
The frequency of each word's occurrence in the English 
language was checked using the Kucera-Francis (1967) norms. 
Data suggest even very large differences between frequencies 
(e.g. 10-3000 occurrences per-million) have no effect on 
visual thresholds (Eriksen, 1963) or auditory thresholds 
(Doppler & Stanners, 1990; Stanners, Cherry, & Carver, 
1989). The pleasant, depressive (unpleasant), and neutral 
words used in this study were within this undifferentiated 
range. 
Response sheets used during the listening portion of 
the experiment had three lines for each trial (Appendix E) 
The first two lines were used for the subjects to check one 
of the two affective categories (Pleasant or Unpleasant). 
The third line was used for the participants to write down 
the word if they could. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the site of the experiment, individuals 
signed a consent form (Appendix A). Subsequent to this, all 
participants completed the BDI, as it has been demonstrated 
that scores are to most reliable when administered on the 
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day of test which ensures valid use of the instrument 
(Sacco, 1981). Those who scored within the aforementioned 
ranges for both depressed and nondepressed were included in 
the study. 
Participants were then escorted to the laboratory space 
containing the apparatus. A brief explanation of the domain 
of the experiment (auditory perception) was given prior to 
each of the phases of the experiment (Appendices B - D). 
Stimulus words were presented to the right ear as previous 
research has shown stronger contralateral pathways than 
ipsilateral producing a right ear advantage for verbal-
presentation of material to right handed subjects (Kimura, 
1961). Concurrent with the presentation of the word to the 
right ear is the presentation of a white noise mask to the 
left ear. A calibration procedure was carried out to 
determine a level of the white noise mask which would 
produce misidentification on a high proportion of trials 
(Appendix B) . 
During calibration, subjects listened to up to ten 
series of five words recorded at 10-second intervals on a 
cassette tape, and instructed to write the words down when 
possible. The calibration words were neutral with regard to 
affective valence and equated approximately for frequency 
and syllabic content. If the subject correctly identified 
any of the five words in a series, the white noise mask gain 
was increased incrementally until a five consecutive misses 
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occurred. Previous research (Stanners & Gordon, 1988; 
Stanners & Doppler, 1990) has shown that this criterion 
produces 60-80% identification errors. 
Following calibration, subjects received 10 practice 
trials and were asked to first categorize the words as 
pleasant or unpleasant and then write down the word when 
possible on the response sheet (Appendices C and E). Five 
of the words were pleasant and five unpleasant/depressive. 
After the practice trials, another tape containing pleasant, 
neutral and depressive (to be categorized unpleasant) words 
was played and the same categorization and reporting task 
required of the subjects. Again, words were matched 
approximately for frequency and syllabic content. There 
were SO of each word valence (pleasant, depressive, neutral) 
for a total of 150 trials. The words were randomly ordered, 
with the restriction that no more than three consecutive 
words from the same category were allowed to occur. The 
number of words was arrived at by doubling the number used 
in the Doppler and Stanners (1990) study which provided an 
adequate number of data points for both the correct 
identification data and the misidentified data; both of 
interest. Including the self-relevant condition made it 
necessary to add a number of trials [double that in the 
Doppler and Stanners (1990) study] which would provide 
adequate data to address all the questions of interest. 
Because of the large number of stimulus items, a break 
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was given to address the potential motivational problems 
with prolonged exposure. No subjects reported that they 
were having any difficulty sustaining attention, and 
virtually all of them opted to continue immediately. The 
stimulus tapes used during each half of the task were 
counterbalanced to control for possible order effects of 
words within the two major exposure periods. 
Apparatus 
Tapes were recorded on a stereo tape recorder/player. 
A noise level meter was used in recording to control the 
voice level of each word so there was consistency in volume. 
Each trial number was recorded on the left channel followed 
by the stimulus word recorded on the right channel with 
10-second intervals between trials. When played into a 
stereo headset, a sound-operated relay detected the onset of 
the word on the right channel and a switching circuit 
presented the output of a white noise generator to the left 
channel. The noise levels were measured by a General Radio, 
Model 1551-C sound level meter. 
Results: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 produced three data sets. The first 
was the 'categorization' data which would be used to assess 
nonconscious perception. Recall that the stimulus words 
were all responded to by having the subjects categorize as 
"pleasant" or "unpleasant" what they believe they heard. 
This data set was restricted to categorization of 
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misidentified words. That is, the subject marked the word 
as pleasant or unpleasant, but wrote it down incorrectly. 
The second data set, addressing response bias, included 
subjects' categorization of neutral words. The third data 
set was the 'identification' data, which consisted of trials 
on which subjects correctly identified the stimulus word 
(wrote it correctly on the response sheet). It was used as 
the measure of perceptual accuracy . 
. Nonconscious Perception 
To start, the focus will be on the categorization data 
(misidentifications). In dealing with the issue of 
nonconscious processing, the response bias issue needed to 
be addressed. In this study, response bias was defined as 
the tendency of subjects to respond "pleasant" more often 
than "unpleasant" (or visa versa) in the absence of any 
semantic information. Response bias was assessed by using 
performance on neutral words as a baseline. Nonconscious 
perception would be indicated by departure of categorization 
performance on the affective words (pleasant and depressive) 
from the performance level on neutral items. 
A correction for response bias, if present, was made by 
adjusting subjects' categOrization scores. The following 
procedure was used for the adjustment. For a given subject, 
the proportion of pleasant categorization given neutral 
stimuli [P(P/N)] was subtracted from the proportion of 
pleasant categorization given pleasant stimuli [P(P/P)] 
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The same was done for depressive word presentation 
categorized as unpleasant ([P(U/U)] minus [P(U/N)]). 
Significant differences, say, between pleasant and 
depressive words for adjusted scores could not then be 
attributed to response bias. In other words, subsequent to 
the adjustment, subjects' ability to process some 
information about the word (correct categorization), 
although they could not identify it correctly, would be 
taken as an indication that stimulus words had been given 
some degree of (nonconscious) semantic interpretation. 
It should be noted that the trials on which subjects 
failed to respond at all were not appropriate data trials. 
This was because there was no way to ensure that subjects 
did not withhold information after having the word in 
awareness at least for some time, however brief. 
Subsequent to the categorization score adjustment, the 
mixed factorial design had three factors. The first two 
were within-subjects factors, 'valence' (pleasant or 
depressive), and 'relevance' (high or low). The 
between-subjects factor was 'depression' (depressed or 
nondepressed subjects). The major question of Experiment 1 
was whether the individual differences factor 'relevance' 
added any precision or accuracy to the design and thereby 
contributing to demonstrating nonconscious processing 
effects. 
The Likert rating scores collected during screening 
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were used to ascertain an individual subject's top 25 words 
in each valence dimension (pleasant, neutral, depressive). 
A given subject's top 25 ratings in each affective dimension 
represented high self-relevant words while the rest 
constituted the low self-relevant words. This 
individualized the stimulus materials by utilizing the 
subjects' ratings for words most self-relevant. The 
anticipated effects were nonsignificant and individually 
tailoring the stimulus materials did not enhance 
nonconscious perception. 
The nonconscious perception data did show a main effect 
for valence, E (1, 46) = 4.40, p = 04. The mean proportions 
for 'valence' were: .1176 (depressive) and .0446 
(pleasant). Subjects, collapsing across 'depression' and 
'relevance', correctly categorized more depressive than 
pleasant material after the data were adjusted for response 
bias. No other significant effects were found in the 
analysis of the categorization data involving pleasant and 
depressive words. 
Response Bias 
Another area of inquiry with regard to how subjects 
categorized data was whether there was evidence of response 
bias and further, whether there would be differences in 
response bias between the depressed and nondepressed 
subjects. This was done by comparing depressed and 
nondepressed subjects on their performance on neutral items. 
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That is, the mean proportion of unpleasant responses given a 
neutral word P(U/N) versus the mean proportion of pleasant 
responses given a neutral word P(P/N) for depressed and 
nondepressed subjects. In this three way mixed factor ANOVA 
the two levels of the within subjects 'response' factor 
refer to pleasant or unpleasant categorization. The other 
within subjects factor was 'relevance', while 'depression' 
(depressed and nondepressed subjects) was the between 
subjects factor. 
The main effect for 'response' was highly significant, 
~ (1,46) = 28.06 2 <.0001. The mean proportions for the two 
levels of the 'response' factor were .616 (pleasant) and 
.384 (unpleasant). Subjects, regardless of depressive 
status or level of relevance, categorized neutral words as 
pleasant significantly more often than they categorized them 
as unpleasant. None of the other main effects or 
interactions were significant. 
Conscious Identification 
As forementioned, the third data set was the 
identification data. This analysis considered the issue of 
identification accuracy. An individual score was the number 
of words correctly identified. A three-way mixed factor 
ANOVA was used to analyze the data. The between subjects 
factor was 'depression' (depressed versus nondepressed 
subjects). The within subjects factors were 'valence' 
(pleasant, depressive, or neutral) and 'relevance' (high or 
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low) 
The analysis did indicate a significant main effect for 
'relevance', E (2,46) = 15.25 2 < .0007. The means were 
5.66 for high relevance, and 4.84 for low relevance. 
Subjects identified significantly more high than low 
relevance words. 
The correct identification data also revealed a 
significant main effect for 'valence', E (2,92) = 64.49, 2 < 
.0001. Because the 'valence' factor contained three levels, 
simple effects tests were required to tease out the sources 
of difference. The means for the three levels of 'valence' 
were as follows: depressive= 6.68, pleasant= 5.12, 
neutral= 3.97. All combinations of the three levels were 
analyzed by using two-tailed t-tests. Contrasting both 
depressive and pleasant with neutral yielded significant 
differences,~ (92) = 11.32, 2 < .01 (depressive versus 
neutral) and~ (92) = 4.80, 2 < .01 (pleasant versus 
neutral). Subjects correctly identified significantly more 
of both depressive and pleasant (affective) words than they 
did neutral words. The comparison between depressive and 
pleasant identification was also significant,~ (92) = 6.52, 
2 < .01; subjects correctly identified significantly more 
depressive than pleasant words. 
Due to empirical evidence that affectivity produces 
greater salience in contrast to neutrally toned stimuli in 
various perception and attention tasks (Cherry, 1993; 
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Kitayama, 1990), a final comparison was made. The affective 
(pleasant and depressive) levels of the 'valence' factor 
were combined and compared to performance on the neutral 
words. The mean for the affective words was 5.90 and the 
neutral word mean was 3.97. The t-test showed a significant 
difference~ (48) = 3.43, p < .01. 
Discussion: Experiment 1 
Nonconscious Perception (Categorization Data) 
Neither the addition of the relevance factor nor the 
depression factor showed up in the main effects or 
interactions in the nonconscious perception data. This 
failure to demonstrate between-group differences might 
suggest that subjects needed to have higher levels of 
depression, possibly into the clinical range. The negative 
finding for relevance also indicates that under conditions 
of nonconscious processing, self-reference ratings of 
affective words failed to influence the type of auditory 
perception involved in the present experiment. That is, for 
some reason the effects of self-relevance that occur on the 
conscious level (e.g. Conscious Identification Data) failed 
to appear at a nonconscious level. This nondistorted 
processing is in contrast to the empirically demonstrated 
relationship between self-relevance and depressive 
distortion in conscious (cognitive and memory literature) 
information processing (e.g. Bradley and Mathews, 1983, 
1988; Bower, 1983). Ic would interesting to be able to 
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replicate results showing information processing that is 
distorted consciously and unbiased unconsciously. 
The categorization data did, however, show a 
significant main effect for 'valence' indicating that 
nonconscious perception was facilitated by depressive words. 
After the adjustment for response bias, subjects (regardless 
of status as depressed or nondepressed) co~rectly 
categorized more depressive words than they did pleasant 
words. This demonstration of nonconscious perception adds 
to previously existing .data using dichotic masking and 
showing nonconscious perceptual effects (Stanners, Cherry 
and Carver, 1989; Cherry, 1993). 
What remains to be explained with regard to the main 
effect for 'valence', is why subjects, especially the 
nondepressed group, performed better on depressive material 
than they did on pleasant material; opposite of what might 
be expected based on theories of memory and emotion, 
depressive cognition, depressive accuracy/perceptual 
s~nsitivity, and perceptual defense (B·ower, 1983; Beck, 
1967; Ruehlman et al. 1985, Erdelyi, 1992). One possibility 
is that it represents some sort of fluke, yet this is 
probabilistically unlikely, especially in light of the fact 
that the same pattern of results had been demonstrated by 
Cherry (1993). She used the dichotic masking paradigm in a 
mixed factorial design. After showing mood induction for 
elation, neutral, and depressed mood, subjects in her study 
The Effects of Depression 40 
nonconsciously perceived information only with the 
unpleasant stimulus words. 
One potential explanation of the nonconscious 
perception of depressive material result is to reconsider 
the emotional classification of stimulus words. The words 
actually form a sort of affective hierarchy, as opposed a 
set of categories (pleasant, depressive, and neutral) used 
in this and other studies. Construction of the valence 
conditions placed the words into actual classes, when such 
words probably form a scale. Perhaps as words vary from 
neutrality or are more affectively extreme, that has an 
effect on memory and accessibility in semantic and/or 
emotional information processing. To explain subjects' 
superior performance on depressive material, then, it would 
be posited that, under the conditions of this experiment, 
depressive valence was more affectively extreme or arousing, 
and therefore more perceptible. Looking at the result from 
the standpoint of perceptual defense, it would have to be 
assumed that the negative valence of the words was not 
sufficiently high to invoke the perceptual defense. Perhaps 
borrowing from the research and using more extreme "taboo" 
words would allow demonstration of defense. 
With regard to the affective hierarchy, there is some 
evidence that addresses this question and could be seen as 
consistent with the arousability notion proffered above. 
Schotte, et al., (1990) demonstrated greater galvanic skin 
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conductance to affectively threatening stimuli in comparison 
to neutral cues in a dichotic listening paradigm (Schotte, 
et al., 1990). Other studies have shown greater arousal, 
measured both physiologically (e.g. higher heart rate and 
respiration and galvanic skin response) and psychologically 
(e.g. perceived sweating, shaking, and anxiety) using 
negatively toned emotional words (Kotze & Moller, 1990; 
Lewis and Lee, 1978; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1987). 
Additionally, there have been effects demonstrated in 
selective attention to threat cues (MacLeod, et al., 1986) 
and Stroop interference, where longer response latencies to 
color naming of emotional words is interpreted as indicating 
heightened attention, semantic activation, and/or arousal to 
the words (Gotlib & Mccann, 1984; Williams & Nulty, 1986; 
Dawkins & Furnhan, 1989; McKenna, 1986; McNally, et al., 
1990). These studies in attention have been corroborated in 
the memory literature, as well, where there is data that has 
demonstrated superior recall and recognition performance on 
affective over neutral stimuli (Bock, 1987; Osgood & 
Hoosain, 1981; Osgood, 1971; Russel, 1978). 
Further, in another memory study, Bock (1987) showed 
that words. were recalled best based on their arousability 
and that this was independent of the affective quality of 
the words. This was a follow-up study to one in which he 
showed that affective ("self-referent") processing occurred 
before semantic processing. In that study, 'affective' was 
The Effects of Depression 42 
operationally defined as "emotional arousability" and 
"relatedness to concerns", while 'semantic' was 
operationally defined as "defineability" and "concreteness". 
The self-referent condition took shorter processing time and 
showed superior recall (Bock & Klinger, 1987). Viewed 
together, these studies suggest, then, that subjects' 
enhanced performance on depressive material might have had 
something to do with the arousability of the stimulus words. 
Looking at this converging evidence showing 
facilitative processing advantage for affective over neutral 
information physiologically, attentionally, in memory, and 
in subjective (psychological) arousal, it seems there is a 
basis to assert that emotionality and arousal enhance 
perception. Such an assertion appears to give the finding 
of nonconscious perception of depressive words at least some 
potential bases. 
Response Bias (Categorization of Neutral Words) 
Another major Experiment 1 question was whether there 
would be evidence of response bias and whether there were 
differences between depressed and nondepressed subjects. 
Here there was a significant tendency for subjects, 
regardless of status, to respond pleasant more often than 
unpleasant. That nondepressed subjects responded pleasant 
more often than unpleasant to neutral words is not 
surprising. In fact, it is consistent with what Vestre and 
Caulfield (1986) referred to as the "normal positive biasing 
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effect," (p. 35), where nondepressed subjects show a 
positive skew in orientation/information processing. It is 
also consistent with the "Pollyanna hypothesis" (Osgood & 
Hoosain, 1983) and the depressive accuracy literature that 
demonstrates nondepressive/"normal" tendency to be biased in 
various information processing tasks including: e.g. 
judgment of control (Martinson, et al., 1984) and recall of 
personal events (Riskind et al., 1982). 
What remains to be explained, however, is why depressed 
subjects failed to show a negatively skewed response bias 
(depressive distortion) or more symmetry between pleasant 
and unpleasant responding (depressive accuracy). One 
possible explanation that has already been suggested in 
light of the negative finding for mood congruity effects in 
nonconscious perception, is that this sample of subjects 
labeled as "depressed" was not severely depressed enough to 
show the distorting effects. In a review of the literature, 
Reuhlman (1985) suggested that more severe levels of 
depression (e.g. BDI scores x > 25) are needed to 
demonstrate clearly distorted thinking. However, given that 
this sample was "moderately" depressed (mean BDI 17.2, range 
12-28) it is inconsistent with what would be predicted by 
Reuhlman's (1985) review where at least a symmetry in 
pleasant/unpleasant (depressive accuracy) responding should 
have been evidenced. More recently, Matt, Vazquez, and 
Campbell (1992) conducted a meta-analytic review essentially 
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corroborating the same pattern reported by Reuhlman (1985) 
They again showed that the level of depression plays the 
role of a crucial variable in showing effects, where only in 
the severe ranges does distortion clearly pervade. They too 
showed the symmetry between valences in the mild to moderate 
ranges. The failure to replicate the Doppler and Stanners 
(1990) finding and the depressive accuracy literature where 
nondepressed asymmetry and depressive accuracy was 
demonstrated is difficult to explain. 
Perceptual Accuracy (Conscious Identification Data) 
This series of analyses was concerned with the 
possibility of differential perceptual accuracy on trials 
where subjects (depressed and nondepressed) correctly 
identified the word despite the noise mask. None of the 
interactions were significant nor was the main effect for 
depression. 
However, the main effect for relevance was significant. 
High relevance words were shown to be identified with 
significantly greater frequency than low relevance words. 
This finding seems to support the notion that tailoring 
stimulus materials to the individual can contribute to 
enhanced effects for consciously identified stimuli; in this 
case greater accuracy in identification. This corroborates 
the supposition that the idiosyncratic nature of a person's 
memory needs to be addressed to maximize effects. It might 
also lend support to the position that for relevance to have 
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an effect, words have to be mediated consciously. 
The main effect for valence was also significant in the 
conscious identification results. Simple effects tests 
revealed that subjects correctly identified more depressive 
than pleasant words, more pleasant than words than neutral 
words, and also more affective (combining depressive and 
pleasant words) than neutral words. This pattern of results 
raises two issues. The first is the depressive 
identification advantage for subjects. Second is the strong 
identification advantage for affectively valenced words 
(depressive and pleasant) in contrast to the neutral words. 
One possible explanation that pertains to both findings 
is to invoke a similar argument as that proffered above for 
the nodconscious perception effect. In a similar way, 
perhaps arousability of the words also contributed to the 
correct identification of the words. As previously 
elucidated, Doppler and Stanners (1990) suggested that there 
is no absolute scale of pleasantness or depressiveness. 
Perhaps as words approximate neutrality, their 
perceptibility is attenuated because their arousal value is 
reduced. Conversely, words may become more salient as they 
become more differentiated from neutrality and arousal value 
increases. Alluded to above, there are data from the 
perception, attention and memory literature that have 
demonstrated superior measures (e.g. semantic 
categorization, galvanic skin response, recall) of 
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performance on affective stimuli over neutral (Bock, 1987; 
Osgood & Hoosain, 1981; Osgood, 1971; Russel, 1978). And as 
was shown in the analysis of the identification data, 
depressive words show nonconscious processing advantages 
over pleasant. Thus, affective word processing may be 
moderated by arousal where depressiveness represents the 
relatively highest arousal levels. 
The reviewed memory literature would have predicted 
that depressively valenced words would have a higher 
threshold for identification for nondepressed subjects in 
contrast to pleasant words because of their incongruity with 
nondepressed mood. This would also be predicted by 
perceptual defense. In this study it might apply to both 
groups of subjects, if indeed this sample was insufficiently 
depressed. It should be noted that this is not, however, 
the first negative result in attempting to show mood 
congruity effects (Bower, et al. 1978; Isen, Shalker, Clark, 
& Karp, 1978; among others). It appears reasonable to. 
suggest that arousability could account for some of these 
negative findings. 
Introduction: Experiment 2 
There is research in nonconscious perception 
demonstrating processing of information of a limited 
semantic scope. This is exemplified in studies of "priming" 
where a semantically related or unrelated word (sometimes 
presented below conscious threshold) either facilitates or 
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inhibits the processing of a subsequently presented word 
(Groeger, 1988, 1984; Marcel, 1980). Elsewhere, priming has 
been defined as facilitation in the processing of a stimulus 
as a function of a recent encounter with the same or related 
stimulus (Cofer, 1967). Greenwald (1992) has interpreted 
this kind of result as indicating the ''limited" capabilities 
of the unconscious in contributing to information 
processing. His point argues against the traditional belief 
(i.e. psychodynamic theories) that the unconscious is much 
more complex in its abilities. However, it does not 
necessarily follow logically from demonstrations of semantic 
priming that unconscious memories might not be involved and 
influential. Nor is it apparent that because subliminal 
inputs are processed in a limited way that unconscious 
cognition is likewise limited (Erdelyi, 1992). That is, 
there is no inherent reason to look at nonconscious 
processing starting with an assumption that it is 
simplistic. On the contrary, there is a need to develop 
empirical approaches that address the apparent 
sophistication in human information processing and make them 
demonstrable. 
This experiment attempts to take one step toward 
extending empirical demonstration of the complexity of the 
unconscious. It also includes an individual differences 
factor; something largely ignored in research into 
nonconscious processing. By involving a depressed sample, 
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the results can also apply to psychological aspects of 
information processing as they may relate to clinical and 
theoretical issues. Additionally, this experiment is unique 
in its extension of a well documented phenomenon (semantic 
priming) into the emotional (affective) domain. 
The numerous findings alluded to earlier in perceptual 
defense (New Look) research have indicated the following 
phenomena. Duration thresholds for correct report of 
emotionally threatening, or anxiety provoking words or 
pictures differ significantly from those stimuli more 
neutrally toned. Galvanic skin responses recorded prior to 
correct recognition are higher for emotional than for 
neutral stimuli. And, pre-recognition guesses as to the 
nature of tachistoscopically presented stimuli differ 
between neutral and emotive stimuli (Dixon, 1981). One may 
notice that this does not speak directly, as yet, to a 
dimension of individual differences. It has been pointed 
out elsewhere that there is a very limited amount of 
research done in the area of perception that has looked at 
individual differences as a factor (Dixon & Lear, 1962; 
Henley & Dixon, 1976; Cherry, 1993). 
One such study that did factor in individual 
differences investigated the effect of depression (mild) on 
tachistoscopic recognition of neutral and unpleasant words. 
The results showed that depressed subjects recognized more 
depressive than neutral words leading the authors to 
The Effects of Depression 49 
speculate that depression may involve a breakdown of 
perceptual defense (Powell and Hemsley, 1984). The results 
are, at least in part, consistent with much of the 
literature reviewed in Experiment 1 indicating effects on 
perceptual threshold levels (i.e. "New Look"). If one 
assumes depressive information is to be defended against, 
then this result could be viewed as a sort of defensive 
breakdown where depressed individuals are less effective in 
screening negatively valenced material. Again, this 
relegates nondepressed subjects to represent our notion of 
"normalcy", as Powell and Hemsley (1984) did. Perhaps 
contrary to this to some degree, there is some literature 
that suggests that depressives may be more 'accurate' and 
that nondepressives may be skewed toward a positive valence 
in information processing as was found in Doppler and 
Stanners (1990). Nonetheless, there are numerous results 
that show mood congruence as generally facilitative in 
processing information (e.g. Matt, 1992; Bower, 1983; Beck, 
1967; etc.) . 
Semantic Priming 
Semantic priming has been demonstrated to be a robust 
phenomenon showing that presentation of a word can influence 
the perception/cognition of a subsequently presented word, 
depending on the semantic relationship between the two words 
(Becker & Killion, 1977; Meyer, Schvaneveldt, & Ruddy, 
1975). More recently, priming effects have been 
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demonstrated using visual and auditory masks and degraded 
stimuli to investigate nonconscious semantic (meaning) 
activation. 
In one study, Marcel (1980) presented three word 
sequences. The first word in each sequence was designated 
the context word (e.g. hand or tree). The second word was a 
polysemous word, which by definition, has alternative 
meanings, (e.g. palm). The third word was a target word 
(e.g. wrist). The purpose of the context word was to bias 
the semantic interpretation of the polysemous words and thus 
influence, through priming, the processing of the target 
word. So, if there were a sequence with 'hand' and 'palm', 
'wrist' would be facilitated, whereas 'tree' and 'palm' 
would inhibit 'wrist' as a response. The question was 
whether conscious or unconscious (absence of recognition) 
presentation of the polysemous word would differentially 
facilitate processing of the target word. 
Subjects were to make lexical (word-nonword) decisions 
on the third word in the sequence (target) where the second 
word in the triad was polysemous. When all three words were 
clearly visible, decision times were faster if all three 
words were unrelated (e.g. tree, race, wrist) than if the 
first two and last two were related to each other, but first 
and third were not (e.g. tree, palm, wrist). The fastest 
decision times occurred when all three words in the triad 
were related (e.g. hand, palm, wrist). So the meaning of 
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the second word decreased decision time to the target word 
only when it was preceded by a word to which it was 
semantically related in the same way that it was to the 
target word. Decision time was increased when the 
relationship between first and second and second and third 
word was different. This result was interpreted as evidence 
that only one meaning of the polysemous word was available 
when all words were clearly visible. 
The unconscious condition was one in which the 
polysemous word was visually masked (unidentifiable) It 
was in this condition that the pattern of results was quite 
different. Lexical decisions to the third word in triads in 
which words one and two and words two and three were related 
(e.g. tree, palm, wrist), as well as trials in which all 
three were related (e.g. hand, palm, wrist), were both 
facilitated relative to lexical decisions for triads made up 
of three unrelated words (e.g. tree, race, wrist). The 
results imply that both meanings of the polysemous word were 
activated when it was unidentifiable. The difference 
between subthreshold and suprathreshold presentation was 
that in the subthreshold condition, two meanings of 
polysemous masked word influenced decision times as opposed 
to one meaning being facilitated in the suprathreshold 
condition (Groeger, 1988). This led the author (Marcel, 
1980) to infer qualitative differences in conscious and 
nonconscious semantic activation. 
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Groeger (1984) showed similar qualitative differences 
in consciously and nonconsciously presented stimulus items 
in a study again using the visual modality. He presented 
single target words and required subjects to select the 
target from a subsequent matrix of words. These matrices 
never contained the actual target words. Rather, the words 
were either semantically or structurally related. Again, 
there was an unconscious presentation condition in which 
. tachistoscopic levels of awareness were determined for each 
subject. When targets were presented without awareness 
(nonconsciously), subjects responded to semantically related 
words. When the target words were identifiable, subjects 
selected visually similar words. 
Groeger (1988) produced similar results using the 
auditory modality. With prime words presented in awareness, 
subjects chose phonologically related target words. 
However, when prime words were presented below a level of 
identifiability, semantically related words were chosen. 
Stanners, Cherry, and Carver (1989), alluded to above, 
also demonstrated semantic priming in the absence of correct 
identification of the prime words. Subjects were presented 
stimulus words using the dichotic masking paradigm (Stanners 
& Doppler, 1990). The prime word was presented to the right 
ear and a noise mask presented to the left ear. The 
word/mask level was calibrated so that the prime was made 
unidentifiable (subject misidentification of the word). 
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Three seconds after the prime, a target word was presented. 
The target was also masked but at a lower level of noise 
than the prime. Identification data were conditionalized on 
their respective primes being misidentified. The results 
indicated both a facilitation priming effect for related 
words and an inhibitory priming effect for unrelated words. 
When viewed together, the studies seem to suggest that 
semantic activation with nonconscious presentation of prime 
words can be demonstrated. Bower's (1981) theory of emotion 
and memory provides a theoretical basis for looking at 
semantic activation with an affective/emotional component. 
Priming is a phenomenon that provides data consistent with 
the propositional network/activation models of memory, while 
Bower's model builds on these basic concepts. Recall that 
when there is a semantic relationship between words, the 
presentation of one should, via propositional connections, 
activate those semantically related. By extension, the 
emotional model of memory (Bower, 1981) would predict a 
similar process of activation between words with congruent 
emotional valences. Again, emotional state should enhance 
the salience of mood congruent material in a priming task. 
The extension, then, moves beyond the semantic relationship 
between words, to an affective/emotional level. Thus, 
Experiment 2 attempts to demonstrate "emotional (or 
"affective") priming". 
Experiment 2 investigates nonconscious perceptual 
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processing and sensitivities between depressed and 
nondepressed subjects. It is predicted that priming will be 
facilitated in affectively congruent (matched) conditions 
and relatively inhibited in unrelated conditions for both 
depressed and nondepressed subjects. This overall priming 
effect is based on Bower's model of emotional memory (1981) 
It is also predicted that there will be between group 
differences with nondepressed subjects showing relatively 
greater facilitation for pleasantly valenced material and 
less facilitation for depressively valenced materials. This 
prediction is based on numerous findings (e.g. Doppler & 
Stanners, 1990; Ruehlman, 1985; Matt, et al., 1992) where 
nondepressed subjects perform better on more pleasant than 
unpleasant words/stimuli. This would also support Bower's 
model where a relatively nondepressed mood would facilitate 
information processing of congruent material (mood-congruity 
effect) . 
With regard to the depressed subjects, the literature 
reviewed thus far in both studies makes it plausible to look 
for symmetry between positive and negative valences of 
stimulus words. That is, depressed subjects might show 
equivalent priming between pleasant and depressive valences. 
That pattern of results would corroborate the perceptual 
accuracy findings. Recall that those data indicate that 
mild to moderately depressed subjects process the emotional 
spectrum of information with more parity or more objectively 
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[sadder but wiser] (Matt, et al., 1992; Reuhlman et al., 
1985). Alternatively, the depressed group might demonstrate 
more facilitation on negatively valenced words than 
nondepressed subjects. If found, that result would be 
interpreted as further support for the mood-congruity 
effect. This theoretical position accounts for facilitation 
on negatively valenced stimuli in the depressed group. 
Method 
Subjects 
Participants (n = 40, 20 in each level of 'depression') 
were chosen from classes offered in the Department of 
Psychology at Oklahoma State University. These included 
introductory and other undergraduate courses in psychology. 
They completed the Beck Depression Inventory during an in-
class screening and on the day of test. The college 
student's scores on the BDI were within the same parameters 
established in the Experiment 1 Method section (nondepressed 
subjects mean= 2.05, range 0-4; depressed subjects mean 
19.1, range 11-32). 
Materials 
The sources of the pleasant, neutral, and depressive 
words were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Response sheets had two lines for each trial. The 
first line was used by the respondents to write down what 
they thought they heard the prime word to be. The second 
was used to write down what they thought the target word to 
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be (Appendix G) . 
Procedure. 
An audio cassette tape was prepared with 20 pairs of 
prime-target words matched for pleasant valence (pleasant 
prime/pleasant target), 20 pairs for depressive valence 
(depressive prime/depressive target), and 20 pairs for 
"Unmatched" valence (50% pleasant prime/depressive target 
and 50% depressive prime/pleasant target). This resulted in 
60 trials where no more than three consecutive occurrences 
of any particular arrangement was allowed in the otherwise 
random ordering. Words were recorded in the same manner as 
they were in Experiment 1 using a sound level meter to 
control the volume of each word and insure approximately 
equal loudness for each word. Another tape was made with 
the same arrangement but with the prime and target words 
reversed in order to counterbalance word order presentation. 
That way each word pair was represented in both prime and 
target position. This manipulation eliminated potential 
confounds of word frequency or word structure in targets 
across the conditions. 
All tapes were recorded with same male voice. For the 
prime words, the calibration procedure used in Experiment 1 
was repeated to adjust the noise level individually for each 
participant. Recall that words were presented through 
stereo headphones to the right ear and mixed with noise 
presented on the left channel. Calibration was done so that 
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the minimum amount of noise was used to produce a high level 
of misidentification or no identification of the prime word. 
The target words were recorded with noise on the left 
channel, and words on the right channel .. This combination 
was presented binaurally so the college students heard the 
word/noise combination through both channels. The level of 
noise mixed with the target words was determined in a pilot 
experiment to produce approximately 30% correct responses. 
This allowed for enough variability in the response measure 
(percent correct identification) to avoid floor and ceiling 
effects. This criterion had been used previously with, 
efficacy (Stanners and Cherry, 1989). 
The practice trials and data trials went as follows. 
The subjects heard a trial number (e.g. "trial number 5.") 
followed approximately one second later by the prime word 
presented in the right channel, which was masked in the left 
channel and presented dichotically. Subjects then used a 
three second interval to write down what they thought the 
prime word was. There is evidence that a longer latency 
than three seconds (e.g. six secs.) leads to rapid 
dissipation and can compromise the size of the priming 
effect (Stanners and Cherry, 1989). After the three second 
interval the target word, mixed with the noise, was 
presented binaurally. This was followed by a 10 second 
interval of silence during which the subject wrote down what 
they thought the target word was and waited for the next 
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trial. Standard instructions were read to each participant 
(see Appendix F). The format of the answer sheet is 
detailed in the materials section. 
Results: Experiment 2 
The first question was whether there was evidence of an 
overall nonconscious priming effect. The data set for the 
analysis consisted of correctly identified target words 
given an affectively congruent prime word. The data were 
conditionalized by using targets only when the prime word 
had been misidentified. The logic was that affective 
nonconscious priming could be inferred if the prime was not 
correctly identified but facilitated perception of the 
congruent target (contrasted with unmatched/incongruent 
prime-target pairs). 
Trials on which no response was given for the prime 
word were not used because of the possibility that the 
subject actually did consciously identify the prime word but 
for some reason failed to write it down. Using only 
misidentified primes appears to remove any argument of 
conscious mediation of the correct prime and allows for a 
strong inference of nonconscious priming. 
Nonconscious priming was tested using a 2-way mixed 
factor analysis of variance (ANOVA). The between subjects 
factor was 'depression' (depressed and nondepressed) The 
within subjects factor was 'valence' ([matched] P/P, 
pleasant target given a pleasant prime; D/D, depressive 
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target given a depressive prime; and [unmatched] D/P, 
depressive target given a pleasant prime or P/D, pleasant 
target given a depressive prime). All word pair 
configurations were counterbalanced. The ANOVA indicated 
that the main effect for valence was significant E (2, .76) = 
3.71 Q, < .029. The valence factor means were as follows: 
matched depressive= 3.925, matched pleasant= 3.625, and 
unmatched 3.025. 
Simple effects of the valence factor were tested. As 
predicted, the results indicated priming effects for matched 
depressive versus unmatched, .t (76) = 2.47, Q < .01, and 
matched pleasant versus unmatched, .t (76) = 1.78, Q < .05. 
The comparison between pleasant was not significant. The .t 
value of the matched pleasant versus unmatched comparison 
was borderline significant. Therefore an additional 
comparison was done to test affective priming combining the 
affectively congruent conditions (matched depressive and 
pleasant) and comparing this joint condition to the 
unmatched condition. Significance was indicated, .t (76) = 
2.57, Q < .01, showing better identification of matched than 
unmatched target words. The joint mean for the matched 
levels (P/P and D/D) was 3.775, which was contrasted to the 
unmatched mean of 3.025. 
Another point of interest was whether depressed and 
nondepressed subjects demonstrated differential effects in 
priming. There was a significant main effect for 
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'depression', E (1,38) = 5.81, p < .02. Depressed subjects 
identified significantly more target words than did their 
nondepressed counterparts (marginal means: depressed= 
3.983 and nondepressed = 3.083). The interaction of 
depression and valence was nonsignificant. 
Discussion: Experiment 2 
The overall purpose of Experiment 2 was threefold. 
First, it was an attempt at replication of the Stanners, 
Cherry, and Carver, (1989) study which demonstrated 
nonconscious priming using the dichotic masking paradigm. 
The result showing identification of significantly more 
matched prime/target pairs than unmatched pairs, when the 
prime word was misidentified, replicates the nonconscious 
priming effect. 
Second, Experiment 2 expanded nonconscious priming by 
using affective word pairs rather than previously used 
semantically related pairs. The positive result for priming 
effects seems to suggest that words that are emotionally 
similar, or matched for valence, facilitate the perception 
of each other relative to word pairs of opposing (unmatched) 
valences. This finding fits into Bower's (1983) theory of 
emotional memory where the activation of affective words has 
been shown to raise related words (or memories) closer to a 
threshold of perception and awareness. Similar mood 
congruence effects have been robustly demonstrated in 
consciously mediated memory studies (see "Memory and 
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Emotion" section) and meta-analysis (Matt, 1992), but the 
present finding represents the only demonstration of 
nonconscious emotional priming. This demonstration of 
activation on the emotional level expands on the semantic 
relationship previously demonstrated consciously (e.g. 
Becker & Killion, 1977} and nonconsciously (e.g. Groeger, 
1984, 1988; Marcel, 1980). 
The third question in Experiment 2 was concerned with 
differential, or between-subjects, priming effects. It was 
hypothesized that this effect would show up in the form of 
an interaction between depression and valence which took the 
form of a nondepressed subject advantage on pleasant 
material and depressive parity or advantage for depressed 
subjects. Mood congruent effects were not statistically 
significant. 
However, there was a difference between the two groups 
of subjects in the significant main effect for depression. 
Depressed participants showed greater nonconscious priming 
effects than the nondepressed group. This main effect 
showing depressed subjects identifying. more target words 
than the nondepressed group was an unexpected finding and 
quite difficult to explain. If any result would have been 
predicted, it would have gone the other way where the 
amotivational and processing slowness sometimes seen in more 
severe levels of depression would have led to poorer 
performance by a depressed group. Again, perhaps depression 
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levels have to be much higher in order to demonstrate 
effects. Speculatively, perhaps a more ideal participant 
would be those who have more chronic problems with 
depressive mood (e.g. dysthymia [APA, 1994]) due to the 
increased likelihood of encoding memories when feeling down. 
This, as opposed to college students who face more 
situational mood depressing events (e.g. impending exams, 
romantic breakups). 
General Discussion 
These studies attempted to link nonconscious perceptual 
research to individual differences in depression and to 
evaluate the effect of individually tailoring stimulus 
materials. In Experiment 1, evidence was shown for self-
relevance, nonconscious perception, response bias, and 
perceptual accuracy of emotionally toned words. However, 
the predicted mood congruity effects were not evidenced. 
With no consistent pattern emerging, the results do not lend 
resolution to some of the mixed findings and controversy in 
the literature (Erdelyi, 1992), especially as they relate to 
valence and the presence or absence of depression. Despite 
this, there were some interesting findings. 
The addition of the relevance factor was useful in the 
identification data contributing to greater effects for high 
relevance words. It would appear that future research using 
single word stimulus presentations might benefit from 
including such a condition. 
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The results from the categorization data and matched 
prime target data showed evidence for the demonstrable 
effects of nonconscious perception, even from the standpoint 
of most stringent criteria. The overall nonconscious 
priming effect and the nonconscious perception effect stand 
as growing support for the use of dichotic masking in future 
research. 
The pleasant response bias toward "pleasant" in 
nondepressed subjects was the predicted result. The failure 
for depressed subjects to show a response bias toward 
"unpleasant", or at least symmetry between pleasant and 
unpleasant is difficult to explain. Perhaps higher BDI 
levels are needed or consideration of a different instrument 
for psychometrically defining depression. Another 
alternative to the use of dysthymia or more chronic low mood 
as discussed above would be to use the Instrument to 
Diagnose Depression (TDD). The IDD assesses depressive 
symptomatology based on DSM III-R criteria which is possibly 
more valid in assigning subjects to the dichotomous 
categories of depressed and nondepressed. It should also be 
pointed out that the use of the BDI may have some inherent 
problems in that by having a good deal of heterogeneity in 
the items, the potential exists to have very different 
people represented by the same score. That is, one person's 
16 may constellate more around somatic or neurovegetative 
symptoms while another person's may be more based in the 
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dysphoria or mood symptoms. Research exists that has 
considered these issues in using the BDI in the context of 
chronic illness [e.g. rheumatiod arthritis] (Young, 1992). 
Another consideration would be related to the 
unpleasantness of the depressive materials. Perhaps the 
words, like subject depression levels, need to represent 
more of an extreme to exert effects. 
In addition to expected results, a convergent, albeit 
somewhat unanticipated, pattern emerged. This includes the 
main effect results from nonconscious categorization and 
conscious identification from Experiment 1. Cumulative 
evidence of a processing advantage of affectively toned 
(depressive or pleasant) material over neutral provides 
support for the supposition that degree of departure from 
neutrality might be a better way of conceptualizing 
affectivity than the traditional categorization into 
discrete categories (e.g. pleasant and depressive). As 
alluded to in the Experiment 1 discussion, there is also the 
possibility that the depressive materials were sufficient to 
produce arousal but insufficiently negative to produce an 
aversive reaction that might produce perceptual defense 
effects. 
The pattern that emerged showed better performance on 
depressive words, which implies that they may be more 
affectively extreme and arousing which enhances their 
perceptibility; nonconsciously and consciously. Viewed 
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together with the Cherry (1993) findings showing the same 
depressive and affective processing advantage, it becomes 
more plausible to hypothesize that an affective hierarchy 
exists and that deviation from neutrality heightens 
perception. 
It may also be of interest to note that in the two 
demonstrations of nonconscious perception (categorization 
and priming) the main effect for depression was only 
evidenced for priming. What this could suggest, is that 
depression somehow effects affective priming of words 
differently than it does categorization.of words. Although 
replication would be necessary to speculate further, if such 
a difference did exist, it could have a fairly significant 
impact on models of memory and emotion where, to my 
knowledge, current theory/models would have no provision to 
explain such a difference. 
In considering future directions for research, the 
argument that arousability plays a role in perceptibility 
could be addressed by having groups of words (self-report 
rated independently and/or generated using GSR measures) 
representing "arousability" and "extreme negativity" levels 
in the valence factor. By adding these levels, contrasts 
could be made between high and low "arousing", "extremely 
aversive/depressive", and "pleasant" words. This would 
provide data to replicate the arousal hypothesis and 
possibly show a threshold, of sorts, for invoking perceptual 
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defense. This would add to future studies in emotional 
information processing in general, and also to the potential 
for demonstrable differences between consciously and 
nonconsciously mediated processing. 
It would be interesting to conduct a priming study 
addressing similar questions as those discussed directly 
above. More specifically, including a "neutral" condition 
would allow for testing of the arousability hypothesis under 
priming conditions. The proposed "extreme" word and level 
of depression condition could also be used to attempt 
demonstration of both perceptual defense and mood congruent 
differences between groups. 
Additional priming studies would also be of interest in 
expanding existing research. Effects using nonconscious 
primes have been demonstrated before (Groeger, 1984, 1988 
and Marcel, 1980). The evidence from this study showing 
priming on an affective level appears to extend previous 
findings of semantic activation when primes were presented 
below a conscious awareness threshold. Another interesting 
direction for future research would be to include a 
conscious prime presentation condition and compare it to an 
unconscious prime condition. Both Groeger (1984 and 1988) 
and Marcel (1980) have shown differences in levels of 
information processing between nonconscious 
(semantic/meaning) and conscious (phonetic and structural) 
processing in visual and auditory tasks. Recall that 
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Groeger (1988) showed consciously presented primes 
facilitated phonologically related words while 
nonconconsciously presented primes facilitated semantically 
related words. 
Other interesting possibilities exist for the dichotic 
masking paradigm. Becker et al. (1993) used dichotic 
listening to measure perceptual asymmetry in adolescents 
with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). They 
were able to show lower right ear advantage for the ADHD 
group presented with positive word pairs, while the control 
group showed higher right ear advantage for positively 
valenced word pairs. The authors inferred that this 
abnormal response by the ADHD subjects lends evidence to a 
reward system dysfunction hypothesis in ADHD. As the 
literature review indicates, there are flaws inherent in 
dichotic listening that are addressed by dichotic masking. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to prefer to use dichotic 
masking to address similar questions. A final example would 
be to use it in studies of drug effects on auditory 
perception of different valences. Hartley et al. (1990) 
demonstrated lateralized differences in perception of 
different valenced words, again, using dichotic listening 
where positive and neutral valences showed a right ear 
advantage, but not negative words. Lastly, if depressive 
mood congruity could be shown more reliably with higher 
levels of depression or PTSD patients could be shown to be 
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sensitized to particular threat cues, then dichotic masking 
could possibly be used as a pre-test and post-test measure 
of treatment outcome (e.g. psychotherapy versus chemotherapy 
versus no treatment). Response bias, conscious 
identification or nonconscious perceptual patterns could be 
dependent variables showing symptom attenuation by different 
response patterns at pre-'test and post-test. Presumably, 
effective treatment would desensitize a patient to these 
threatening depressive words or threatening stimuli. 
Showing differences post-treatment (e.g. single subject 
design) using these measures might be quite useful in 
assessing treatment efficacy. 
Further study using dichotic masking is interesting to 
consider. However, it will be important to get improved 
methodological control over the stimuli and their 
presentation. At present, the technology exists that would 
take each word and digitize it making it amenable to 
tighter audiological control. That way, the noise 
calibration could still be used to accommodate individual 
differences in hearing ability. As it was in these 
experiments, the sound variation was somewhat loosely 
controlled in comparison to what could be available with 
digital technology. 
Generally speaking, these two experiments enhanced 
knowledge in the area of nonconscious processing. 
Additionally, the findings contribute to a greater 
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understanding of the idiosyncratic contributions to a 
person's processing of information. Importantly, these 
studies address the emotional domain and therefore imply 
both an experimental and clinical relevance. Dichotic 
masking allows for exploration in the area in a way that 
answers prior methodological criticisms and can thereby lead 
to inferences about extended domains of information 
processing. Study in this area has been limited and 
challenging due largely to phenomena that, by definition, do 
not avail themselves to conscious or 'observable' scrutiny. 
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APPENDIX A 
Consent Form 
I, , hereby authorize or direct 
Matt Doppler or associates or assistants of his choosing, to 
perform the following treatment or procedure: 
Procedure: Participants will listen to a word, through 
headphones, accompanied by white noise. The participant 
will then be asked to write what was heard (prime word) and 
then to repeat that process after a three second latency 
( target word) . 
Duration: Participation will involve one session of about, 
but not exceeding, one hour. 
Confidentiality: Participants will in no way be identified 
with their responses. Names will not be written on the 
response form and screening information will be destroyed. 
Benefits: Participants will benefit from exposure to 
experimental techniques used in cognitive psychology. 
Results of this study will add to the literature of 
perception and depressive cognition. 
This is done as part of an investigation entitled "The 
effects of depression on nonconscious perception." The 
purpose of the procedure is to determine if the participants 
can extract enough information from the masked auditory 
stimulus for it to be able to contribute to identification 
of a subsequently presented word, and to assess between-
participant response characteristics. 
I understand that participation is voluntary, that there is 
no penalty for refusal to participate, and that I am free to 
withdraw my consent and participation in this project at any 
time without penalty after notifying the project director. 
I certify that I am at least 18 years of age. I may contact 
Dr. John Chaney at 744-6027 should I wish further 
information about the research. I may also contact Jennifer 
Moore, University Research Services, 001 Life Sciences East, 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078; telephone: 
(405) 744 5700. I have read and fully understand the 
consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has 
been given to me. 
Date Time 
(Signature of Subject) 
I certify that I have personally completed this form and 
explained it to the subject before requesting the subject to 
sign it. 
(Signature of Director or Associate) 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions for the Calibration Trials 
We are studying some aspects of auditory perception in 
this experiment. Your task as a subject will change 
somewhat from one part of the experiment to another, but in 
all parts of the experiment, we want you to be a very 
careful listener. 
In this part of the experiment we want you to try to 
identify words that are accompanied by a static-like noise. 
First you will hear a trial number and then a word mixed 
with noise. Try to identify the word and write it on the 
line next to the appropriate trial number. If you think you 
know what the word was but are not really sure, write down 
your answer. If you have not idea what the word was, put a 
line in the space where the word would go. You will have 
about 10 seconds on each trial. 
I will stop you and check your answers after every 
group of five trials. This is so that I can adjust the 
noise to the appropriate level. 
This is not a hearing or individual test of any kind, 
so don't worry about having to make any particular score. 
Just listen very carefully and do your best. 
Do you have any questions? 
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APPENDIX C 
Instructions for the Practice Trials 
In this part of the experiment, you will again listen 
to words accompanied by noise. This time, however, we want 
you to do two things after you hear the word and noise. The 
first thing we want you to do is to indicate on your answer 
sheet your best judgment of whether the word was a pleasant 
or an unpleasant word. 
you judge a word you 
It may seem a little strange to ask 
may be unsure of, but please go along 
with us. We simply want your best judgment even though you 
feel you may be guessing. After you make your 
pleasant/unpleasant judgment, try to write the word down on 
the appropriate line. If you are unsure of the word, it is 
perfectly all right to write down what you thought the word 
was. If no word occurs to you, then you may go ahead and 
put a line in the place where the word would go. 
Any questions? 
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APPENDIX D 
Instructions for the Experimental Trials: Experiment 1 
In this final part of the experiment, your task will be 
exactly the same as in the previous part. Listen carefully 
to each word which will be accompanied by noise. Make a 
pleasant/unpleasant judgment first on every trial. Then 
write down what you thought the word was. If you can't be 
sure, write your best impression of what the word was. 
Otherwise, put a line where the.word would go. 
There will be 150 trials in this part of the 
experiment. We understand that it is easy to let your 
attention wander after listening carefully for awhile. If 
you need a short break, let the experimenter know and you 
can take one. Please do not let your attention drift, but 
try to concentrate on each word and do your best. 
Any questions? 
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APPENDIX E 
Response Sheet: Experiment 1 
Trial Number Pleasant Unpleasant 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
7 . 
8. 
9 . 
10. 
Word 
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APPENDIX F 
Instructions for the Experimental Trials: Experiment 2 
In this part of the experiment you will do basically 
the same thing except that you will hear pairs of words. 
First you will hear a trial number and then two words with 
about three seconds in-between them. Each word will be 
mixed with the noise. Try to identify the words and write 
them on the lines next to the appropriate trial number. 
Write the first word on the first line and the second word 
on the second line. You will have about 10 seconds to write 
both words. As before, it is perfectly all right to guess; 
write whatever word you think you heard. 
If you cannot identify one or both of the words or even 
make a guess, then put a line in the place where the word 
would go. Make sure that you write the word on the correct 
line. If on some trial you identify the words in reverse 
order; that is, you write down the second word and then 
identify the first word, put a check mark next to the trial 
number. 
This is not any kind of individual test, so don't worry 
about mistakes or misses. Just try to do your best. 
It is easy to let you attention wander after listening 
for awhile. Please do not let your attention drift, but 
concentration each word. 
Any question? 
Response Sheet 2 
Word 1 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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